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Abstract: There are two competing hypothesizes on whether firms that are part of a business group 
should pay higher or lower dividends. Under one hypothesis, that can have different theo-
retical assumptions, firms that are a part of a business group should pay higher dividends. 
In contrast, if the pecking order hypothesis holds, firms that operate within a business 
group should pay lower dividends. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of 
group affiliation of Croatian firms, which are listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange, on their 
propensity to pay dividends. Two panel data models were used in line with recent literature 
and the results of the study show some evidence that the pecking order theory was followed 
by Croatian firms. From this result the conclusion is that Croatian firms are more likely to 
pay dividends if they are not part of a business group.
Keywords: Business Group; Dividend Policy; Internal Capital Market; Pecking Order Theory
JEL Classification: G30, G35, L26
Introduction
The literature on the topic on dividend policies and payouts is very rich. What is 
meant by this statement is that there are vast number of theoretical models and em-
pirical studies in this particular field of corporate finance. It can be said that the 
research on dividends started with the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
In that paper they claimed that under the conditions of the perfect market, rational 
behavior and perfect certainty dividend policy of firms is irrelevant in the sense that 
it cannot influence the firm value. From that moment on, there have been and prob-
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ably will still continue to be disputes and debates on the role that dividends play on 
many aspect of corporations. To further complicate the matter, there is a question 
does group affiliation matter to dividend payouts of firms. This is a very important 
question that is the center of this paper and one that we wish to answer on the sam-
ple of Croatian firms because there are reasons to think that when financial markets 
have frictions, internal and external capital markets are not substitutes (e.g. Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). There are additional postulates that need to be looked and analyzed be-
fore attempting to answer that question. To put it differently, another line of research 
in the financial and economics literature needs to be put alongside traditional cor-
porate finance findings, and that is the internal capital markets field of firm analysis.
Internal Capital Markets and Dividends
Just as one can argue that the work of Miller and Modigliani (1961) started a wide 
interest in the subject of dividend policies, it can also be argued that the works of Al-
chian (1969) and Williamson (1975) made the internal capital markets an established 
research filed in the scientific literature. Both claim, in some sense, that the more the 
firm is diversified the more efficient it becomes. The consequence of a well-diversi-
fied firm is a potential of the firm to establish its own internal capital market, whereby 
internal capital market we mean capital allocation mechanism to various firms busi-
ness segments (Peyer, 2002). Since the early lines of research on the topic of internal 
capital markets, there have been a great number of studies that have found mixed 
results with regards to the efficiency of internal capital markets. Several reasons were 
postulated to justify the hypothesis that internal capital markets are efficient. Diver-
sification of business activities was already mentioned. The reduction of agency costs 
is one possible reason why internal capital markets of diversified firms could be more 
efficient than of those firms that do not have diversified business activities (Fluck & 
Lynch, 1999). In addition to diversification, “winner-picking” is another explanation 
of the efficient internal market hypothesis. Stein (1997) by emphasizing the role of 
the corporate headquarters states that internal capital markets can add value to a cor-
poration if funds are actively allocated to business segments in line with the expec-
tation of their performance. Finally, synergies between business units were proposed 
as an explanation of internal capital market efficiency (Williamson, 1975). There is 
no clear and exact definition of synergy in the internal capital markets literature, but 
the underlying point is that capital allocation from one business segment to others is 
guided by the maximization of the value of business segments that the capital was 
transferred to.  
On the other hand, some studies have found the opposite, meaning that inter-
nal capital markets are inefficient in allocating resources to profitable segments of 
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the firm. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) showed that firms, when faced with 
increased opportunities, have made investments in inefficient investment projects. 
Additionally, Shin and Stulz (1998) point out that the shortage of cash flows by one 
segment can affect other segments investments regardless of the profitability of the 
mentioned investments. This line of research with regards to internal capital markets 
wouldn’t be relevant for this paper, in other words the examination of business group 
dividend payouts, if it weren’t for the fact that business groups do have their own 
internal capital markets (Samphantharak, 2006). 
In light of the above presented information, there is potentially a connection be-
tween the existence of internal capital markets of business groups and dividend pay-
outs. The influence of business group affiliation on dividend policies of corporations 
is not as widely studied as other influences on dividend payouts and as other aspects 
of internal capital markets, for example the question of internal capital market ef-
ficiency that was previously presented in this paper. Put it differently, there have 
been few papers that connect internal capital markets (business groups) and dividend 
policies of firms (e.g. Gopalan, Vikram & Seru, 2014; Goldman & Viswanath, 2017). 
Nevertheless, from the theories of an internal capital market it follows that managers 
will have capital from different segments of the corporation and they must make 
decisions regarding the use and allocation of that capital (Liebeskind, 2000). One of 
the ways managers could use the mentioned capital is to payout dividends. Just as was 
the case with the efficiency of internal capital markets, there are conflicting theories 
with regards to dividend payments of business groups. By conflicting theories we 
mean theories that start from different axioms and finish with different conclusions 
and predictions. 
The pecking order theory was phrased by Myers (1984) and it states that the firm 
will prefer to use internally generated funds over external financial resources because 
using internally generated funds will send positive signals to investors. Even though 
acquiring debt could also be regarded as a positive signal, firms would firstly use re-
tained earnings to finance their investment projects. High flotation costs of external 
sources of financing are the second reason why firms could follow this pattern of 
financing (Donaldson, 1961). This theory predicts that larger firms, which have de-
veloped internal capital markets, should pay lower dividends because they can more 
effectively finance their investments than smaller firms which do not have internal 
capital markets (Goldman & Viswanath, 2017).
In contrast, market failure theory predicts that firms, that are part of a business 
group, should pay higher dividends. Market failure theory is a theory that explains 
the existence of internal capital markets from the perspective of information asym-
metry and market imperfections. These factors were also used in the literature to ex-
plain dividend policies of corporations (Manos, Murinde & Green, 2012). Assuming 
the market failure theory and the fact that firms that are part of a group are connect-
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ed through equity ownership (they can more easily transfer profits), group affiliated 
firms should have a higher propensity to payout dividends. 
Traditional Explanatory Variables of Dividend Policies
In addition to group affiliation, several other factors have been proposed and tested to 
explain the propensity of firms to pay dividends. They can be grouped into internal 
and external factors. In this paper only internal factors were used to ensure the ro-
bustness of the panel data model. Since the purpose of this article is to test dividend 
payout policies by Croatian firms that belong to a business group, external factors 
were not chosen because they are mainly concerned with the country that the firm is 
established and operates. The internal factors that were used in the analysis are firm 
size, growth, leverage and profitability.
Firm size has been studied as an explanatory variable for corporate dividend pol-
icies and the results point to the conclusion that bigger firms pay more dividends. We 
say “point to the conclusion” in view that there have been studies, a minority, that 
have found this relationship to be negative. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) have shown, 
that among German firms, the size of the firm negatively affects dividend payouts. In 
contrast, Fama and French (2001) have found that, although firms in the United States 
of America in the 1970s and 1980s were overall less likely to pay dividends, smaller 
firms were less inclined to pay dividends. Similar results, regarding the effect of firm 
size and dividend policy, can be found in Al-Kuwari (2009) who sampled firms from 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. These reason why most studies 
have found a positive effect is that larger firms have easier access to capital (Holder, 
Langrehr & Hexter, 1998) and are less likely to go bankrupt (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). 
Growth is another statistically significant determinant of dividend policies that 
can positively and negatively affect dividend payouts. The reason by this factor was 
found to be significant is that dividend payouts are directly linked to the size of 
earnings. In addition to the problem of the influence of growth on dividend payouts 
of firms, growth was defined and measured differently by authors of several studies 
which also adds ambiguity to the effect of growth on dividend policies. Growth can 
be defined as expected investment opportunities that can be measured as a ratio of 
market to book value of assets or market to book value of equity. Fama and French 
(2001) found this influence of growth on dividend policies to be negative, in other 
words to more the firm has investment opportunities it is statistically less likely to 
pay dividends. Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) have found that this effect is of the 
opposite sign. Other authors define growth differently, they define growth as the an-
nual growth of sales. Defining growth this way can, somewhat, reduce the ambiguity 
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of the expected impact of growth on dividend policies. This approach of classifying 
growth was used in this paper. When firms are experiencing growth of sales they 
have to have financial resources to maintain higher levels of sales. If the assumption 
of higher cost of external financing holds, firms will use internally generated funds 
for investments. Because of higher capital expenditures firms will not pay dividends, 
in other words when firms have high growth of sales they will be less inclined to pay-
out dividends. This model was first proposed and tested by Rozeff (1982) and since 
has had other empirical confirmation (e.g. Llyod, Jahera & Page, 1985).
Leverage of firms can and was measured, in many studies, by different financial 
metrics but the overall conclusion that can be made is that the more the firms is lev-
eraged it is less likely to pay dividends. There are two reasons for this conclusion. 
One is that higher leveraged firms have less flexibility in their investment decisions, 
in other words they will not distribute dividends to shareholders because of future 
debt obligations (Aivazian, Booth & Cleary, 2003). The second reason is tied to the 
theoretical model of agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). The model states 
that dividend payouts can reduce the agency costs of free cash flow because the man-
agement of firms cannot use it for value destroying purposes. This model has also 
been tested and has empirical support (Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994).
Profitability of firms can also explain the difference in their dividend policies. 
The reason why more profitable firms should pay more dividends is very intuitive 
in view of the nature of dividend payouts. Dividends are paid, mostly, from retained 
earnings so the more retained earnings (more profitable) a firm has the higher their 
potential is to payout dividends. There are numerous papers that found empirical 
evidence for this claim (e. g. Fama & French, 2001; Aivazian, Booth & Cleary, 2003)
Data and Methodology 
The sample consists of firms that have issued securities on the Zagreb Stock Ex-
change and that are still listed at the time that the information from the firms was 
gathered, which was in the month of April 2018. There are a total of 92 firms in the 
sample, but not all firms that have listed securities on the Zagreb Stock Exchange 
were incorporated in the sample. We follow the common practice in the literature 
in this area and excluded from the sample financial firms, government owned firms 
and state bodies. The selected period was from 2006 to 2017 because the Zagreb 
Stock Exchange released annual reports only for that time interval so we could not 
find reports before 2006. Furthermore, some firms did not publish their financial re-
ports for the year 2017 in the time that the information was collected for this article 
and some firms did not publish their financial reports for previous (early) years, for 
example 2006 and 2007. For these reasons the panel data is unbalanced. The ratio of 
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dividend payments over earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion is the dependent variable in our models. Figure 1. shows how this ratio changed 
for all firms in our sample from 2006 to 2017. Croatian companies do not have sta-
ble dividend to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ratios. 
Furthermore, the values of the ratio are low reach the lowest value in 2006 and the 
highest in 2009. From this and form the fact that 47 of 91 companies have made at 
least one dividend payment in sample period (14 of the 47 have distributed dividends 
one or two times), a preliminary conclusion can be made that Croatian firms do not 
frequently and consistently make dividend payments. Why Croatian firms do not use 
dividends is beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 1: Ratio of dividend payments over earnings before interest, taxes, deprecia-
tion and amortization
Source: Authors’ own calculation, data from reports of corporations listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange
Next we categorized firms whether or not they belong to a business group. The 
criterion for categorization is not established in the literature, or in other words the 
criterion varies from study to study. The criteria that was used in this research was the 
percentage of ownership, to be more specific if a firm has 51% ownership of another 
firm the latter firm is regarded as a group member. Since the data has a cross-sectional 
and time component, the appropriate statistical method is panel analysis. Even though 
many economic phenomena and relationships depend on their previous values, studies 
that have been carried out on this topic did not include lagged values in their models. 
In other words, most studies used static over dynamic panel data models when trying 
to test the relationship between group affiliation and dividend payments. Again, we 
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dividend payments. Again, we followed the method that was predominantly used in the 
literature. In addition, some studies (e.g. Gopalan, Vikram & Seru, 2014) used the Tobit 
model because the data is censored to ensure the validity of their results. The Tobit model was 
also used it this study. Furthermore, most studies used dummy variables as a constant term, 
but did not use dummy variables to consider the differences in the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. We used both the additive and the multiplicative form of dummy 
variables to examine further relationships and for robustness checks.  
The first step in the statistical analysis was to determine the appropriate model for our 
data. Since we assumed that the group affiliation was constant through the selected period, the 
fixed model was not the appropriate model. Nevertheless, a Hausman test was carried out and 
the results are displayed in table 1. From the results of the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, we can conclude that the random effects model is more suitable for our dataset 
than the fixed effects model. The next test that was used was the Breusch and Pagan LM test 
for random effects on the basis on which we can determine whether to use the random effects 
model or the polled OLS model. The results of this test are also shown in table 1. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of the Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects and therefore 
conclude that the polled OLS model should be used in our analysis. 
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followed the method that was predominantly used in the literature. In addition, some 
studies (e.g. Gopalan, Vikram & Seru, 2014) used the Tobit model because the data is 
censored to ensure the validity of their results. The Tobit model was also used it this 
study. Furthermore, most studies used dummy variables as a constant term, but did not 
use dummy variables to consider the differences in the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. We used both the additive and the multiplicative form of dummy variables to 
examine further relationships and for robustness checks. 
The first step in the statistical analysis was to determine the appropriate model for 
our data. Since we assumed that the group affiliation was constant through the select-
ed period, the fixed model was not the appropriate model. Nevertheless, a Hausman 
test was carried out and the results are displayed in table 1. From the results of the 
Hausman test, the null hypothesis is not rejected, we can conclude that the random 
effects model is more suitable for our dataset than the fixed effects model. The next 
test that was used was the Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects on the basis 
on which we can determine whether to use the random effects model or the polled 
OLS model. The results of this test are also shown in table 1. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of the Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects and therefore 
conclude that the polled OLS model should be used in our analysis.




Breusch and Pagan LM test 0.00
(0.48)
Note: p-value in parenthesis.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Results
The results of the polled OLS model are shown in table 2 and the results of the Tobit 
regression are shown in table 3. The variables in the tables are categorized as follows:
•	 Dividend payout: the ratio dividends paid by firm over its earnings before in-
terest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
•	 Group: dummy variable that identifies a firm that is part of group
•	 Firm size: natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of the firm
•	 Growth: the percentage growth of sales
•	 Leverage: : the ratio of total book value of debt over its book value of total 
assets
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•	 Profitability: the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amor-
tization over its book value of total assets
•	 Group*Firm size: multiplicative term of group dummy variable and natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets of the firm
•	 Group*Growth: multiplicative term of group dummy variable and the percent-
age growth of sales  
•	 Group*Leverage: multiplicative term of group dummy variable and the ratio of 
total book value of debt over its book value of total assets
•	 Group*Profitability: multiplicative term of group dummy variable and the ra-
tio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization over its 
book value of total assets
Table 2: Panel model with pooled OLS (dependent variable: Dividend payout)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group -0.217 (0.312) - - - -

















































Group*Firm size - -0.010 (0.015) - - -
Group* Growth - - -0.001 (0.010) - -
Group*Leverage - - - -0.295 (0.490) -
Group*Profitability - - - - -0.320 (2.433)
N 835 835 835 835 835
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Table 3: Panel model with Tobit (dependent variable: Dividend payout)































































Group* Growth - - -0.039 (0.090) - -
Group*Leverage - - - -0.083 (0.176) -
Group*Profitability - - - - -0.970
* 
(0.522)
N 835 835 835 835 835
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
The results of the importance of group affiliation on dividend payouts are mixed. 
With regards to the model 1 in table 2, which shows the results of the polled OLS 
with no multiplicative terms, we find no evidence that group affiliation affects div-
idend payouts. Furthermore, no multiplicative terms were found to be significant. 
These results, from the polled OLS model, imply that group membership does not 
have any effect on dividend payouts of the sampled firms in Croatia.
In contrast, the results in table 3 of the Tobit model show that group membership 
is a factor in explaining dividend payouts of firms. Group membership is statistically 
significant on all levels of significance. The sign of the coefficient is negative mean-
ing that firms are less likely to payout dividends if they are part of a business group. 
In other words, there is reason to suppose that the pecking order theory holds for the 
sampled firms from which it follows that the sampled firms prefer to finance their 
investment projects with internally generated funds. In addition, two multiplicative 
terms were also found to be statistically significant. Group and firm size are signif-
icant on all levels of significance, while group and profitability was significant on 
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10% level of significance. This implies that effect of firm size and profitability, on the 
censored values of the dividend payouts indicator, was greater for firms that were not 
part of a business group. 
Conclusion
Dividend policies and internal capital markets have been extensively studied from 
different aspects for many years and there is still an ongoing debate with regards 
to their capability to enhance firm value. While there have been many studies that 
looked at these firm components separately, there have been few studies that incorpo-
rated them in one model. Furthermore, the findings of these studies were not conclu-
sive and have produced mixed results. What is meant by that statement is that there is 
no decisive evidence on whether group affiliated firms should pay higher dividends 
in comparison with firms that are not part of a business group. Two general theories 
have been proposed and empirically tested. Pecking order theory predicts that group 
affiliated firms should pay lower dividends, while the market failure theory predicts. 
The goal of this paper was to examine which of these theories, if any, holds for Cro-
atian firms that listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. The key findings are that firms 
that are part of a business group pay lower dividends which is in accordance with 
the pecking order theory. However, the results vary dependent on the panel data that 
was used. Using the polled OLS model we found no evidence for the effect of group 
affiliation on dividend payouts. In contrast, using the Tobit model group affiliation 
and the size and profitability interactive terms were found to be significant. From this 
we can conclude that there is some evidence on the influence of group affiliation on 
dividend policies of Croatian firms. There are a few limitations in our study that fu-
ture studies could take into account when doing further analysis on this topic. Firstly, 
different studies use different definitions of group membership but we define a firm 
as being part of a business group if it does not have the majority of its own equity 
ownership. The problem is that there is not settled definition of business groups and 
the results could vary by using different definitions of business groups. Secondly, 
we assume that group affiliation is time invariant and future studies could relax this 
assumption. Also future studies could look at dividend payouts more minutely, for 
example the difference between of dividend policies of foreign and non-foreign firms 
that are part of a business group or the effect that investments in business groups have 
on dividend payouts. 
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